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Alternatives to the current system of separate tax accounting, such as the proposed Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base in Europe, would apportion a firm’s worldwide profits using formulas based on
the location of employment, capital or sales.  This paper offers a new method of evaluating the accuracy
of these apportionment rules and the ownership distortions they create.  Evidence from European company
accounts indicates that apportionment formulas significantly misattribute income, since employment
and other factors on which they are based do a very poor job of explaining a firm’s profits.  For example,
the magnitude of property, employment and sales explains less than 22 percent of the variation in profits
between firms, and the prediction estimates from using such a formula exceed half of predicted profits
64% of the time, and exceed twice predicted income 11% of the time.  As a result, the use of formulas
rewards or punishes international mergers and divestitures by reallocating taxable income between
operations in jurisdictions with differing tax rates.  The associated ownership distortion is minimized
by choosing factor weights to minimize weighted squared prediction errors, for which, based on the
European evidence, labor inputs should play little if any role in allocation formulas.  But even a distortion-
minimizing formula creates large incentives for inefficient ownership reallocation due to the enormous
variation in profitability that is unexplained by formulary factors, implying that significant resource
allocation costs would accompany European adoption of formulary apportionment methods.









Governments tax active business income earned within their borders, a practice that is 
fraught with difficulty under any circumstances, and particularly so when a firm earns income in 
more than one country.  Since tax rates differ between countries, multinational firms usually 
have incentives to arrange their affairs in ways that reallocate taxable income between countries.  
An excessively transparent method of doing so would be to sell a paper clip from an affiliate in a 
low-tax location to an affiliate in a high-tax location, charging a price of $1 million.  This 
transaction would create a tax deduction of $1 million in the high-tax buying country, and 
taxable income of $1 million in the low-tax selling country, thereby reducing total global tax 
obligations.  Cognizant of these incentives, governments have adopted arm’s length pricing rules 
dictating that for tax purposes the prices used for intercompany transactions must be the same as 
those that would have been chosen by unrelated parties transacting at arm’s length.  Clearly, the 
arm’s length pricing standard takes care of the problem of $1 million paper clips, but there is 
widespread concern that the difficulty of applying the arm’s length standard to many ordinary 
cases, to say nothing of complex transactions involving sophisticated financial instruments or 
intangible property such as patents and trademarks, leaves ample opportunity for tax avoidance. 
In reaction to fears about actual or potential tax avoidance under the arm’s length pricing 
standard, there have been numerous calls for stiffer enforcement of the transfer pricing rules, 
with some expressing doubt that it is possible to craft intercompany pricing rules that can ever 
succeed.  These advocates suggest abandoning altogether the current system of separately 
accounting for income earned in distinct jurisdictions, replacing it with a system that uses simple 
formulas to apportion the worldwide income of multinational firms among the jurisdictions in 
which they have operations.  These formulas typically use some combination of employment, 
sales, and tangible property as implicit indicators of where firms actually earn their incomes.  
American states currently use simple formulas to apportion the incomes of multistate businesses 
within the United States, and, relying on that experience, some (e.g., Martens-Weiner, 2006) 
suggest that formula apportionment might work well internationally. 
In order to adopt a system of formula apportionment it is necessary to specify the weights 
attached to different factors used to apportion income, and the difficulty of doing so in a sensible   2
way makes vivid at least some of the costs associated with replacing separate accounting with a 
system of formula apportionment.  In the United States, where state governments use formulas to 
apportion corporate income for tax purposes, states have failed to settle on a common formula.  It 
is far from clear what factors properly enter an apportionment formula – assuming that 
governments could coordinate on a common formula – if the goal is to allocate income roughly 
according to where it is earned.  Furthermore, as noted by Gordon and Wilson (1986), the use of 
formulas to apportion taxable income effectively converts an income tax into a multiple rate tax 
on the use of the productive factors that enter the formula, with associated deadweight loss from 
this haphazard diversity of tax rates.  These problems have a common source, which is that 
profits are not simple scalar functions of employment, sales or tangible property.  Instead, profits 
are produced by many factors, including managerial inputs, that are difficult to measure or 
subject to reporting manipulation, and therefore omitted from the formulas that governments use.  
Put simply, the formulas do not apportion income accurately among the jurisdictions in which it 
is earned. 
There is something distasteful and very possibly inequitable about misattributing income 
for tax purposes, but the associated problems do not stop there, as income misattribution creates 
incentives for firms to structure their affairs in new ways.  Since the formulas apply to affiliates 
within consolidated groups, it follows that the use of allocation formulas creates incentives to 
modify the ownership of companies or operations in order to reduce associated tax burdens.  
Consider, for example, a profitable German company with income taxed by Germany at a high 
rate.  If European governments required companies for tax purposes to allocate their profits 
among affiliates using formulas that rely heavily on the location of employment, then the 
German company would have a strong incentive to acquire an unprofitable Irish company with a 
large labor force.  In joining the German and Irish operations under common ownership, many of 
the German profits would be attributed to Ireland for tax purposes, where they would be subject 
to the much lower Irish corporate tax rate.  Conversely, if the Irish company had large profits and 
the German company did not, then the use of formula apportionment might discourage a merger 
of the two firms even if the merger would otherwise make sense for business reasons. 
Formula apportionment is typically defended as a pragmatic compromise, representing an 
imperfect alternative to the current, arguably flawed, system of separate accounting.  The   3
purpose of this paper is to analyze the nature and magnitude of ownership distortions created by 
allocation formulas, the extent to which formulas misattribute income when firms merge or 
divest their operations.  Evidence can be obtained by considering the consequences of 
hypothetical mergers between firms that are currently independent and therefore report their 
incomes, employment, sales and property separately.  Using data from a large sample of 
European companies, it is clear that mergers among them, treating two firms for this purpose as 
though located in different countries, would result in significant reallocations of taxable income, 
even in the absence of any effect of the mergers on actual operations or profitability. 
The formulas used to attribute income between countries can be thought of as forecasts of 
what fraction of total firm income is likely to have been earned by affiliates with given shares of 
employment, sales, and property.  The analysis in this paper formalizes this notion, identifying 
conditions under which the formula that minimizes the efficiency cost of ownership distortions is 
the same as the formula that minimizes the weighted sum of squared residuals in a regression 
explaining total pretax income.  This framework implies that regressions can be used to compare 
formulas that assign different weights to employment, sales, and property, as well as to construct 
alternative formulas. 
The evidence implies that existing formulas fare poorly from a prediction standpoint: the 
absolute value of prediction errors from a formula based equally on employment, sales and 
property exceeds predicted profits 64% of the time, and exceed twice predicted profits 11% of 
the time.  In unconstrained regressions employment seldom gets a significant coefficient.  This is 
hardly surprising given that employment expenditures are costs and therefore subtractions in 
calculating pretax income, but employment nonetheless persists in playing significant roles in 
most contemplated and actual allocation formulas.  For example, the European Commission 
(2004) notes that its Home State Taxation pilot scheme would allocate profits of 
multijurisdictional firms based entirely on employment (either payroll or numbers of employees), 
or else on an equal-weighted three-factor formula including payroll, sales and property.  While 
none of these schemes would succeed in accurately representing income, use of the employment 
formulas would be particularly inaccurate.  In view of the sizeable ownership and resource 
allocation distortions introduced by any of these formulas in Europe, the relevant policy question 
is whether the alternative is sufficiently bad to warrant such a step.   4
Section 2 describes current systems of separate entity accounting, evidence of taxpayer 
responses, and proposed formulary alternatives and their consequences.  Section 3 analyzes the 
distortions associated with misattribution of income, and presents a framework that can be used 
to estimate the consequences of formulary alternatives.  Section 4 describes the available data on 
European companies, and section 5 presents the empirical estimates of the magnitudes of 
prediction errors due to the use of formulas.  Section 6 is the conclusion. 
2.  Separate Accounting and Formulary Methods 
The current international practice of using separate accounting to determine taxable 
income has come under considerable fire from critics who point to the difficulties of enforcing 
the arm’s length pricing standard against the determined behavior of taxpayers.  There is direct 
and indirect evidence that firms currently arrange their affairs in ways that relocate taxable 
income from high-tax countries to low-tax countries,
1 which is likely to be inefficient.  There are 
several possible solutions to this problem, including stiffer enforcement together with minor 
modifications of existing rules (Gresik and Osmundsen, 2008), though radical reform is always 
an option.  Whereas separate accounting is generally acknowledged to offer a theoretically 
satisfying method of measuring income for tax purposes, concern over the practical ability of 
governments to operate separate accounting underlies much of the appeal of alternative methods 
of determining the location of business income. 
Formulary alternatives to separate accounting can take different forms, relying to 
differing degrees on sales, property, and employment factors to apportion income among related 
parties.  In the equal-weighted three-factor formula once commonly used by American states, the 
fraction of a firm’s national income taxed by an individual state equals the state’s share of the 
firm’s sales, tangible property, and employee compensation, with each of these three factors 
weighted equally.  There is considerable recent interest in possible adoption of a form of 
formulary apportionment within Europe, the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001).  Gordon and Wilson (1986) analyze some of 
the distortions introduced by making tax obligations functions of sales, property, and 
employment rather than the production of income: the tax system thereby discourages sales,   5
investment, and employment.  Given these distortions, it is perhaps not surprising that American 
states have modified their apportionment formulas over time to emphasize the less distortionary 
sales factors at the expense of property and employment,
2 even though this evolution may or may 
not be in the interest of states as a group.  One of the open questions about formulary methods in 
the international context is the extent to which the use of separate accounting by the rest of the 
world increases or reduces the desirability of using formula apportionment within a small 
federation of countries.
3  The adoption of formulary methods would occasion significant 
redistributions through changes in the tax obligations of individual firms (Shackelford and 
Slemrod, 1998) and the tax revenues of individual countries (Devereux and Loretz, 2008; Fuest 
et al., 2007).  Formula apportionment does not require information on location-specific 
profitability, though this feature may make it more difficult for governments to tailor their tax 
systems to extract rents from taxpayers in the most efficient possible manner (Gresik, 2008).  
Even the possible administrative cost and compliance benefits of formulary methods (Mintz, 
2004) may be suspect; Roin (2008) notes that many of the methods taxpayers have honed in 
avoiding income taxes under separate accounting can be deployed to avoid taxes determined by 
formulary methods, in some cases at greater social cost and to greater effect on tax collections. 
One of the costs associated with using formulary apportionment is that these systems 
create incentives for firms to change their operations through mergers or divestitures.  Even in 
the absence of formula apportionment it is very common for mergers and divestitures to have 
significant tax effects by triggering the realization of capital gains, changing the ability to offset 
profits from one operation against losses from another, influencing a firm’s ability to claim 
foreign tax credits, changing asset bases for depreciation purposes, and other tax consequences.
4  
There is considerable evidence that tax attributes influence the likelihood and structure of 
mergers and divestitures, as well as the accompanying transaction prices.
5  Consequently it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 See, for example, Clausing (2001, 2003), Desai et al. (2003), Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2008), 
and Mintz and Smart (2004); Hines (1999) and Gresik (2001) reviews some of the earlier empirical evidence. 
2 See Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), Anand and Sansing (2000), Edmiston (2002), Wellisch (2004), and, for an 
alternate viewpoint, Runkel and Schjelderup (2007). 
3 See, for example, Mintz and Weiner (2003) and Riedel and Runkel (2007). 
4 Scholes et al. (2005) offers a nontechnical review of some of the tax considerations in mergers and divestitures. 
5 See, for example, the evidence presented by Auerbach and Reishus (1988), Dhaliwal et al. (2004), Erickson 
(1998), Erickson and Wang (1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2007), Hayn (1989), Kaplan (1989), Maydew et al. (1999), 
Schipper and Smith (1991), and Weaver (2000).   6
reasonable to expect that the ownership incentives created by the adoption of formula 
apportionment might significantly influence patterns of mergers and divestitures. 
3. Distortions 
  This section analyzes the ownership distortions associated with the use of formulary 
methods, and in particular, the method by which it is possible to estimate the magnitude of these 
distortions using data from a cross section of independent firms. 
3.1  The extent of income misattribution from using formulas. 
It is helpful to consider the tax consequences of a merger of two firms, designated firm 1 
and firm 2.  Firm 1 operates entirely in country 1, where it faces a profit tax rate of  1 τ ; firm 2 
operates entirely in country 2, where its profits are subject to tax at rate 2 τ .  Countries 1 and 2 tax 
multijurisdictional firms using a common formula with weights  i α  to each of  n i ,..., 1 =  factors 







1 α .  Firm 1’s taxable profits are 
represented by  1 π , where profits equal revenues minus deductible costs including purchases of 
intermediate goods from other firms, labor and interest expense, but not including the 
opportunity cost of invested capital.  Firm 1’s factors are denoted  i x1  for all  n i ,..., 1 = ; similarly, 
firm 2’s profits are denoted  2 π , and its factors denoted  i x2 .  The aggregate tax obligation for the 
two firms in the absence of a merger equals: 
( 1 )       ( ) 2 2 1 1 π τ π τ + . 
If the two firms merge in such a way that their factor use and profits are unchanged, then the 
only difference produced by the merger is that their tax obligations to countries 1 and 2 will be 
determined by formula, and the total is: 
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The difference between (1) and (2) is( ) ψ τ τ 2 1 − , for which:   7
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α ψ . 
The difference in total tax obligation induced by formula apportionment is the product of tax rate 
differences and differences in ratios of profitability to factor use.  Clearly, there is no difference 











.  In the first of these cases the equality of tax rates implies that the 
taxpayer’s total obligation is the same regardless of the jurisdiction to which income is assigned; 
in the second case, the formulas assign income exactly as it is earned.  For most cases, however, 








, the ratio of average 
profits among all firms () π  and average use of factor i ( ) i x , equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
(4)   () () ∑ ∑




















































π α ψ . 











1 α  to be firm 
one’s average share of all factors, weighted as in the common allocation formula, and similarly 
for firm two, so that  1 2 1 s s − = .  Then (4) can be rewritten as: 
(5)  () [] ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =



























































α π ψ . 
The right side of equation (5) consists of three terms, the first of which is  1 s  times the 










2 , with weights equal to  i α .  One can 
think of this difference as being the residual from a regression equation in which the  i α  are 
regression coefficients used to predict  2 π  based on  i x2 .  The mean prediction error of this 
regression is clearly zero, since the  i α  sum to one and firm profits must average the sample 
mean π , but the sum of squared residuals from this regression depends on the values of the  i α .    8
It is convenient to denote the value of the residual predicting  2 π  in this regression, the first 
bracketed term on the right side of equation (5), as  2 r .  Likewise the second term on the right 
side of equation (5) is the product of  2 s  and the analogous residual from the equation predicting 
1 π  based on i x1 ; hence this product can be represented as  2 1s r .   
The third term on the right side of (5) is the weighted sum of the difference between  i x1  









α .  This sum is a function not of the ability of 
factors to predict profitability, but instead of differences in the relative factor intensities of firms 
1 and 2, since  i x1  differs from  () i i x x s 2 1 1 +  because  1 s  is an average taken across all input 
factors, not merely factor i.  The value of this sum is likely to be of second order importance 
relative to the prediction errors that constitute the first two terms on the right side of equation 
(5); for example, it is exactly zero in the case in which a single factor receives unit weight in the 
allocation formula and other factors have zero weight.
6  Taking this term to be of second order 
relative to the others, equation (5) can be written: 
( 6 )        2 1 1 2 s r s r − = ψ . 
Hence the merger of two firms misallocates their income for tax purposes by an amount equal to 
the weighted difference of the residuals in the equations explaining their incomes. 
3.2  The economic cost of income misattribution. 
From the standpoint of efficient resource allocation, the cost of misattributing economic 
income by using an allocation formula includes the possibility that this misattribution may 
influence whether firms merge or divest their operations.  A merger between firms 1 and 2 is tax 
favored if () ψ τ τ 2 1 −  is negative, and tax disfavored if ( ) ψ τ τ 2 1 −  is positive; the magnitude of 
() ψ τ τ 2 1 −  determines the extent of tax incentive.  A conglomerate consisting of two affiliates 
equivalent to firms 1 and 2 similarly faces incentives to divest one affiliate if () ψ τ τ 2 1 −  is 
                                                 
6 As noted in the discussion of the empirical evidence in section 5, empirically this third term in equation (5) is of 
much smaller magnitude than the other terms in the equation.   9
positive, and to avoid divestiture if () ψ τ τ 2 1 −  is negative.  These tax incentives say nothing 
about the business merits of these mergers or divestitures, though as a general matter the 
existence of such tax incentives can be expected to reduce efficiency by introducing 
considerations other than pretax profits into ownership decisions. 
In order to estimate the magnitude of the ownership distortion due to formula 
apportionment, it is necessary to understand the extent to which firms are likely to change their 
ownership of affiliates or other firms in response to these tax incentives.  There is apt to be 
considerable variation, since influencing the decision requires that a firm be sufficiently close to 
the margin that tax considerations become decisive.  Firm size is sure to be correlated with this 
proclivity: Exxon Mobil is unlikely to attempt to acquire British Petroleum in order to save $100 
million in taxes – given the other costs associated with such an acquisition – even though two 
medium sized firms would find a tax saving of that size an irresistible inducement to merge.  
Exxon Mobil might, on the other hand, consider acquiring a small oil company in return for a 
modest tax saving, since relative to the size of the acquisition the tax saving could loom large. 
One way to formalize these notions is to specify that the probability that firms 1 and 2 
merge is given by: 














in which k is a function of various non-tax attributes of firms 1 and 2, γ  is a constant,  1
~ x  is the 
size of firm 1’s assets, and 
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= .  The numerator of the ratio in (7) is the tax consequence of the merger, 
and the denominator captures that doubling the size of both the target and the acquirer also 
doubles the required tax saving to have the same effect on merger probabilities.  This 
denominator reflects the cost of merging, and its size effects are not symmetric: whereas 
increasing the size of the smaller of firms 1 and 2 indeed increases the tax benefit necessary to 
encourage a merger, increasing the size of the larger of the two firms may reduce the needed tax   10
benefit.  Thinking of the much larger firm as the acquirer, as the acquirer grows in size it has 
greater access to financial and managerial resources that reduce the cost of a merger. 
With a probability of merger given by (7), the standard Harberger triangle approximation 
(Hines, 1999) to the deadweight loss associated with tax incentives, denoted Δ , is given by one-
half the product of the tax incentive  ( ) [ ] ψ τ τ 2 1 −  and the induced behavioral change: 








~ ~ ~ ~ 2
1





The value of 
2 ψ  is given by: 
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Taking firms 1 and 2 to be randomly matched, it follows from the fact that  1 r  and  2 r  both have 
mean zero that the expected value of 
2 ψ  is: 
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~ s s = , reflecting that the ratio of two firms’ 
assets roughly tracks the ratios of their factors used in the allocation formulas.  Furthermore, the 
expected value of the squared prediction error is itself a function of firm size, so: 
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which in turn implies that:    11


















τ τ γ . 
Equation (13) indicates that the deadweight loss from income misattribution by formulary 
methods is proportional to the product of the square of tax rate differences and sum of squared 
estimation errors, normalized by asset sizes.  Clearly, the formulary system that minimizes the 
deadweight loss from ownership misallocation associated with income misattribution is one that 
minimizes the weighted sum of squares of prediction errors, with weights equal to firm assets. 
3.3. Interpretation. 
Equation (13) implies that the expected economic cost of ownership distortions 
introduced by misattributing income is proportional to the product of the square of tax rate 
differences and the expected squared prediction error from using a formula.  This comes from the 
Harberger triangle representation of deadweight loss, which takes a second-order approximation 
that the distribution of tax benefits is roughly uniform across the affected population, so for those 
firms whose merger or divestment decisions are influenced by the use of formula allocation, the 
average economic cost of this distortion equals half of the tax incentive produced by the formula.  
This, together with the equation determining the likelihood of tax-motivated ownership changes, 
implies that small tax incentives produce very small expected deadweight losses, whereas large 
tax benefits for some firms may create significant deadweight losses. 
The analysis in section 3.2 considers a potential merger of two firms chosen at random, 
and it is the randomness of this matching that makes it possible to ignore the third term on the 
right side equation (9), the expectation of which is zero, and thereby replace equation (9) with 
equation (10).  Clearly, potential merger candidates are not in fact randomly matched, though 
whether their matching is random relative to potential tax benefits introduced by the use of 
formula apportionment is another matter.  The analysis considers individual firm matches, but 
once a system of formula apportionment is in place the distribution of firm attributes will change 
as assets are reallocated in response to tax incentives.  As Gordon and Wilson (1986) note, in the 
absence of merger costs every firm will face the same average tax rate in equilibrium, since any 
tax differences will be eliminated through the process of tax-motivated mergers and divestments.  
It is, however, unrealistic to think that asset reallocation can proceed so costlessly or easily.  The   12
framework underlying the empirical analysis assumes that potential merger partners are brought 
together for non-tax business reasons, at which point tax considerations have the potential to 
influence the outcome by affecting the potential net benefits of a merger.  Furthermore, tax-
motivated mergers are either sufficiently limited in number that they do not significantly 
influence the distribution of firm attributes throughout the economy, so these attributes can be 
taken to be exogenous from the standpoint of the analysis, or else they are quite frequent, in 
which case it is clear that they are the source of large economic distortions. 
Both tax and prediction error terms enter the formula for efficiency cost in Equation (13).  
Assuming that tax rates are determined by considerations that do not include the details of 
formula apportionment, and taking firm attributes to be distributed independently of tax rates, it 
follows that the formula that minimizes the expected squared prediction error also minimizes 
deadweight loss from ownership distortions.  This is the ordinary least squares estimate of the 
formula components: OLS is the minimum variance unbiased linear estimator, and by 
construction in this case the mean estimation error is zero and the estimates are linear in the 
components.  Hence in order to implement equation (13) to find the distortion-minimizing 
formulary apportionment scheme, it is simply necessary to run regressions explaining 
profitability on the basis of observed factors. 
4. Data 
In order to evaluate the magnitudes of tax-induced ownership distortions it is necessary to 
estimate the extent to which apportionment factors explain the variation in firm profitability.  
The data on European firms come from the Amadeus-Bureau Van Dijk database, which 
includes firm-level data on over 5 million private and publicly owned non-financial firms in 34 
European countries in both eastern and western Europe. The Amadeus database is created by 
collecting standardized data received from information providers across Europe. The local source 
for these data is generally company registrar offices, which require all incorporated firms to 
submit annual filings. The database includes firm-level accounting data in standardized financial 
format.  
The empirical analysis considers only firms with 100 or more employees, since Amadeus 
coverage of very small firms varies with country- level filing requirements, and tax-motivated   13
international ownership changes are likely to be focused on larger firms. The key variables in 
this analysis are fixed assets, enterprise value, sales, profit/loss before taxation, number of 
employees, and labor compensation.  Fixed assets are defined as “tangible fixed/long-term assets 
net of depreciation”, which does not include financial assets; fixed assets can be thought of as 
property plant and equipment (PPE).  Enterprise value is the sum of a firm’s yearend market 
capitalization and debt (both long term and short term) minus cash.  Excluding firms with 
missing value for these variables, and using only consolidated statements, the final sample 
includes 11,103 firms for which there is information on a firm’s profit/loss before taxation, and 
1,473 firms for which there is information on year-end enterprise value. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these variables;
7 the top panel reports the 
figures for the sample with information on profits and losses, and the bottom panel for the 
significantly smaller sample with information on enterprise value.  The skewed distribution of 
firm sizes is evident from this table, in that mean entries for every variable greatly exceed sample 
medians.  In the sample of firms reporting profits and losses, median profit for 2004 was $3.9 
million; these firms had median sales of $116.2 million, median property, plant and equipment 
holdings of $23.6 million, median labor compensation of $21.6 million, and a median of 427 
employees.  The smaller sample of firms reporting enterprise value had median enterprise values 
of $160.9 million, and had roughly double the median sales, property plant and equipment, labor 
compensation and employment of firms not reporting enterprise values. 
The empirical work in section 5 uses these data to estimate the extent to which 
observable factors explain income differences.  Since the Amadeus data are financial accounting 
entries, they need not correspond to taxable incomes, and are potentially subject to their own 
sources of bias and noise, as executives may manage entries to meet earning targets and 
otherwise present their firms to financial markets as favorably as possible.  Whether these 
financial data are more or less reliably reported than information presented to tax authorities is 
an interesting question, but in any case tax data are confidential and therefore unavailable for this 
analysis, and it is revealing to use the financial data to compare the accuracy of alternative 
methods of predicting a firm’s income. 
                                                 
7 Appendix Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for versions of these variables weighted by the square root of firm 
assets; these are the variables used in the regressions that follow.   14
The available information covers the operations and incomes of independent companies, 
whereas the analysis in section 3 concerns separate operations within the same multinational 
firms.  In using data from separate companies to estimate the consequences of allocating income 
using formulary methods, there is an implicit assumption that the income generating process in a 
cross section of firms resembles the income generating process among affiliates of the same 
firm.  Certainly this assumption looks sound if mergers are tax-driven marriages of convenience; 
and even in the case that ownership of divisions or affiliates is determined by pretax profitability, 
with production, sales, and cost spillovers among components of the firm, it is nonetheless 
reasonable to expect that to a first order the contribution of an affiliate to total firm profitability 
is closely related to its profitability as a stand-alone entity. 
5.  Determinants of Income and Market Valuation 
In evaluating the predictive quality of different allocation formulas, it is helpful to start 
with benchmark formulas whose coefficients are unconstrained by prior choices but instead 
determined by the data.  These benchmark formulas come simply from regressions of income on 
factors that enter the formulas.  These regressions have the potential to reveal the ability of 
different factors to account for income production, and to help evaluate the extent to which 
simple formulary rules depart from weights that are indicated by the data. 
Table 2 presents regressions of profits and losses, and enterprise values, on measures of 
sales, tangible property, and employment.  The regressions reported in columns 1 and 3 use labor 
compensation as measures of labor input, whereas the regressions reported in columns 2 and 4 
use numbers of employees; as a result, the sample sizes are much larger in the even-numbered 
columns.  In all of the regressions variables are weighted by the square root of firm assets.  
Observable measures do a creditable job of predicting operating income, in that the R-squareds 
lie between 0.2 and 0.4, though this largely reflects differences between small firms and large 
firms.  The point estimates in column one imply that, controlling for property and employment, 
$100 of additional sales, interacted with the ratio of mean income to mean sales, is associated 
with $60.95 of additional operating income.  Given the values reported in Appendix Table 1, this 
implies that $100 of additional sales, conditional on property and employment, correlates with 
$2.80 of additional income.  Similarly, controlling for other factors, the regression implies that   15
$100 of additional property, interacted with the ratio of mean income to mean property, is 
associated with $25.60 of additional operating income – or that $100 of additional property, 
conditional on sales and employment, correlates with $7.13 of additional income.  The estimated 
coefficients on sales and tangible property are both significant, though it is notable that the t-
statistic on the sales coefficient exceeds that on the property coefficient.  The 0.0654 point 
estimate on labor compensation implies that $100 of additional labor compensation, interacted 
with the ratio of mean income to mean labor compensation, is associated with $6.54 of additional 
income, and this magnitude does not differ statistically from zero. The regression reported in 
column two using employment as a measure of labor input produces similar results. 
Columns 3 and 4 report coefficient estimates obtained by repeating these regressions with 
enterprise value as the dependent variable.  Sales and property again significantly affect 
measured income, and the employment variables perform significantly better in these 
regressions, with positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients, albeit smaller than 
those for sales and property. 
Figure 1 plots predicted and actual values of profits and losses, where the prediction is 
drawn from the model reported in column 1 of Table 3.  It is clear from the figure that while 
predicted values capture the central tendencies of the data, there is just an enormous amount of 
idiosyncratic variation that no three-factor formula can hope to reflect.  Figure 2 performs the 
same exercise for the equation predicting enterprise value, a dependent variable that is truncated 
at zero, but that nevertheless exhibits considerable unexplained variation.  Of course, 
constraining the formulas by omitting one or two of the factors, or imposing equality among the 
coefficients on all three, only reduces the predictive power of the equations. 
Tables 3 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that include just two factors, 
sales and measures of employment.  The results indicate that the sales variable does almost all of 
the work in explaining measured income.  The employment coefficients are statistically 
insignificant in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 in which profit is the dependent 
variable, and the employment variable is insignificant in the regression reported in column 4 in 
which enterprise value is the dependent variable.  Only in column three, in which enterprise 
value is the dependent variable, does the labor compensation variable have a coefficient that   16
differs significantly from zero, and its t-statistic of 2.06 is quite a bit smaller than the 
corresponding t-statistic of 8.53 on the sales coefficient. 
It may not be surprising that labor cost factors do a very poor job of predicting income, 
given that labor expenses are deductible in calculating income; whereas capital expenses are 
typically only partially deductible, and greater sales conditional on factor inputs contribute to 
income.  As Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) and Anand and Sansing (2000) note, American states 
have moved over time to give greater weight to sales factors in their apportionment formulas, 
and typically have incentives to do so in order to attract mobile economic activity, quite apart 
from any improved income attribution (though the destination-based sales definition in the 
formulas does not correspond exactly to the firm-based sales definition in the Amadeus data).  In 
contrast, the variant of the European Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposal in 
which income would be allocated purely on the basis of labor inputs would attribute income 
production particularly poorly. 
In practice, formulary methods as used by U.S. states and Canadian provinces, and 
advocated for use internationally, do not correspond to the unconstrained regressions presented 
in Tables 2 and 3.  Instead these formulas follow fixed rules, such as equal weights on each of 
the sales, property and employment factors, or double weighting sales in a three-factor formula, 
or two factor formulas with equal weights on property and employment.  Table 4 presents 
summary statistics from regressions based on these and other formulary alternatives.  The table 
reports 
2 R  statistics from the underlying regressions in each row.  The first row presents data for 
the unconstrained three-factor regression, and all of the following rows report the extent to which 
their 
2 R  statistics exceed that of the unconstrained regression. 
The figures in Table 4 illustrate the extent to which constraining the regressions reduces 
their predictive power.  The equal weighted three-factor formula produces an 
2 R  that is 6.29% 
smaller than that for the unconstrained formula predicting profits (using labor compensation as a 
measure of employment), and 4.62% smaller in predicting enterprise value.  Use of a three-factor 
formula with double weight on the sales factor significantly mitigates the loss of 
2 R , as do the 
two-factor regressions in which labor compensation does not appear.  Even with sales and 
property constrained each to have 50% weight, these two-factor formulas come within 4.8% of   17
the 
2 R of unconstrained three-factor formula predicting profits (using labor compensation as the 
employment measure) and 1.9% of the 
2 R of unconstrained three-factor formula predicting 
enterprise value. 
The two-factor formulas that include labor compensation and are constrained to use equal 
weights perform very poorly from an 
2 R standpoint, the equation in which property and wages 
predict profits producing an 
2 R  22% lower than that for the unconstrained three-factor formula.  
The culprit is clearly the labor compensation variable, as revealed by the one-factor formulas 
reported in the bottom four rows of Table 4.  Whereas use of the sales factor alone to predict 
profits produces an 
2 R  value within 7.4% of that produced by an unconstrained three-factor 
formula, the labor compensation factor generates an 
2 R  40.2% smaller, and total employment an 
2 R  58.2% smaller.  The property factor alone is similar to the labor factors in generating low 
2 R  
values. 
One indicator of the performance of a formula is the distribution of its predictions relative 
to actual values.  Table 5 presents the distribution of the ratio of forecast errors to forecasted 
incomes for the unconstrained regressions.  Columns 1 and 2 indicate that the absolute value of 
the error in predicting firm profits exceeds half of the predicted value 64% of the time, and the 
error in predicting enterprise value exceeds half of that predicted value roughly 50% of the time.  
The table indicates that the absolute value of the error in predicting profits exceeds twice the 
predicted level of profits 11% of the time, and the error in predicting enterprise value exceeds 
twice the predicted value 8-9% of the time; clearly, there are significant numbers of cases of 
large prediction errors.
8 
The constrained regressions perform considerably worse on average than do the 
unconstrained three-factor formulas.  Table 6 presents the distribution of forecast errors for the 
three-factor formulas in which sales, property and employment are assigned equal weights.  The 
                                                 
8 A similar calculation can be used to measure the absolute magnitude of the third term on the right side of equation 
(5) relative to predicted firm profits.  In order to evaluate this third term it is necessary to specify a merger partner, 
which is taken to be a firm with mean values of sales, property, and labor compensation.  The absolute values of the 
third term are tiny compared to the prediction errors that are the basis of the calculations presented in Table 5.  For 
example, in the regression reported in the first column, only 12.1% of firms have third terms that exceed (in absolute 
value) 10% of predicted firm profits, 2.3% of firms have third terms that exceed 25% of predicted profits, fewer than 
0.05% of firms have third terms that exceed 50% of predicted profits, and none exceed 75% of predicted profits.   18
absolute value of the prediction error from the equal-weighted three-factor formula exceeds half 
of predicted profits 65% of the time, and exceeds twice profits 11-13% of the time.  These 
prediction errors do not differ greatly from those reported for the unconstrained regressions in 
Table 5, and the differences between the prediction errors of the unconstrained and constrained 
three-factor regressions are similarly modest for equations predicting enterprise values. 
6. Conclusion 
Formulary alternatives to separate entity accounting hold the undeniable appeal of 
reducing certain opportunities for tax-motivated international income reallocation.  This comes at 
a serious cost, which is that the factors that enter the formulas do not accurately correspond to 
the determinants of business incomes.  As a result, the formulas misattribute income, so their use 
in an international setting would misallocate tax revenue among countries and tax burdens 
among taxpayers.  In so doing, the adoption of formula apportionment creates incentives for new 
forms of tax avoidance through mergers and divestitures. 
Evidence from European companies indicates that commonly proposed formulas predict 
little more than one fifth of the observed variation in profits, and roughly one third of the 
variation in market capitalization.  In particular, the labor cost factors do a very poor job of 
predicting income.  The analysis in section 3 of the paper shows that the ownership distortions 
associated with the use of formulary methods are proportional to the mean squared prediction 
error in a regression explaining firm income, with weights equal to the inverse square root of 
firm size.  Since the estimated coefficients are very unkind to the labor factors, they suggest that 
governments that must use formulas maximize the accuracy of income attribution and minimize 
the deadweight loss of ownership distortions by ignoring or significantly downplaying the labor 
input factors – though since the formulas also distort investment, employment, and other 
economic decisions in addition to ownership, the total distortion-minimizing formula would 
incorporate all of these considerations. 
Is it sensible to consider formulary alternatives to separate accounting for tax purposes, 
given the inaccuracy of formulary methods and the incentives they create?  Evaluating this 
question requires a careful comparative examination of all of the unappetizing tax choices that 
governments face.  Hard experience makes problems more evident in the tax systems that   19
governments use than in the alternatives, but it does not follow that tax reform improves matters, 
since it generally replaces one set of problems with another.  It is clear from the evidence that 
formulas attribute income very imperfectly, so whether the associated costs are acceptable 
depends on how dire one considers the international tax regime today.   20
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Profit/Loss Before Tax Sample Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation No. Obs.
Profit/Loss Before Tax 50,568 3,887 532,941 11,103
Sales 769,265 116,191 4,996,061 11,103
Property, Plant and Equipment 302,307 23,579 2,508,819 11,103
Labor Compensation 128,030 21,610 776,490 11,103
Employment 2.493 0.427 14.039 11,103
Enterprise Value Sample Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation No. Obs.
Enterprise Value 2,745,505 160,889 12,200,000 1,473
Sales 2,685,770 252,717 10,500,000 1,473
Property, Plant and Equipment 1,052,864 57,255 4,828,504 1,473
Labor Compensation 470,387 58,523 1,843,462 1,473
Employment 9.024 1.108 33.344 1,473
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics - Unweighted





Sales 0.6095 0.5908 0.2480 0.2061
(0.1462) (0.1099) (0.0552) (0.0927)
Property, Plant and Equipment 0.2560 0.2599 0.4754 0.4991
(0.0832) (0.0814) (0.0368) (0.0407)




No. of Obs. 11,103 11,103 1,473 1,473
R-Squared 0.2109 0.2135 0.3404 0.3629
(1) (2)
Table 2
Determinants of Profits, 2004, WLS Results
Notes: The Table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining 2004 profits as functions of contemporaneous sales, capital, 
and labor inputs.  All equations are estimated using weighted least squares, with weights equal to one divided by the square root of 
contemporaneous firm assets.  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.




Sales 0.7158 0.7227 0.5987 0.5688
(0.1331) (0.0912) (0.0702) (0.0931)




No. of Obs. 11,103 11,103 1,473 1,473
R-Squared 0.1996 0.2017 0.2787 0.2953
Table 3
Determinants of Profits, Two-Factor, WLS Results
Notes: The Table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining 2004 profits as functions of contemporaneous sales and labor 
inputs.  All equations are estimated using weighted least squares, with weights equal to one divided by the square root of contemporaneous 
firm assets.  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Profit/Loss Before Tax Enterprise Value
(1) (2)  28
Dependent Variable:
Obs. R
2 % loss in RSS  % loss in RSS  Obs. R
2 % loss in RSS  % loss in RSS 
3-factor, unconstrained (wages) 11,103 0.2109 0.00% 1,473 0.3404 0.00%
3-factor, unconstrained (employees) 11,103 0.2135 0.00% 1,473 0.3629 0.00%
3-factor, equal weights (wages) 11,103 0.1976 -6.29% 1,473 0.3247 -4.62%
3-factor, equal weights (employees) 11,103 0.1866 -12.62% 1,473 0.3346 -7.80%
3-factor, double sales weights (wages) 11,103 0.2059 -2.35% 1,473 0.3187 -6.38%
3-factor, double sales weights (employees) 11,103 0.2017 -5.52% 1,473 0.3352 -7.64%
2-factor (sales and PPE), unconstrained 11,103 0.2101 -0.35% -1.59% 1,473 0.3344 -1.78% -7.85%
2-factor (sales and PPE), constrained 11,103 0.2007 -4.81% -5.99% 1,473 0.3340 -1.88% -7.95%
-100 00%
2-factor (sales and wages), unconstrained 11,103 0.1996 -5.36% 1,473 0.2787 -18.14%
2-factor (sales and employees), unconstrained 11,103 0.2017 -5.55% 1,473 0.2953 -18.64%
2-factor (sales and wages), constrained 11,103 0.1822 -13.58% 1,473 0.2648 -22.23%
2-factor (sales and employees), constrained 11,103 0.1594 -25.36% 1,473 0.2625 -27.66%
2-factor (PPE and wages), unconstrained 11,103 0.1643 -22.11% 1,473 0.3320 -2.48%
2-factor (PPE and employees), unconstrained 11,103 0.1564 -26.76% 1,473 0.3540 -2.44%
2-factor (PPE and wages), constrained 11,103 0.1641 -22.19% 1,473 0.3203 -5.92%
2-factor (PPE and employees), constrained 11,103 0.1434 -32.87% 1,473 0.3101 -14.54%
1-factor (sales) 11,103 0.1978 -6.20% -7.37% 1,473 0.2750 -19.23% -24.23%
1-factor (PPE) 11,103 0.1196 -43.29% -43.99% 1,473 0.2886 -15.22% -20.46%
1-factor (wages) 11,103 0.1261 -40.23% 1,473 0.2109 -38.04%
1-factor (employees) 11,103 0.0892 -58.24% 1,473 0.1820 -49.85%
Income Prediction Accuracy among Formulas
Table 4
Profit/Loss Before Tax Enterprise Value
Notes: The Table presents R
2 statistics from regressions explaining 2004 profits as functions of contemporaneous sales, capital, labor costs, and number of employees.  All equations are estimated using weighted least squares, with weights equal to 
one divided by the square root of contemporaneous firm assets.  29
Table 5: Prediction Errors in the Unconstrained ‐ Three Factor Model
Model 1212
Number of Firms 11,103 11,103 1,473 1,473
mean[ |π‐hat(π)|  / hat(π) ] 1.09 1.08 2.43 1.00
median[ |π‐hat(π)|  / hat(π) ] 0.69 0.69 0.50 0.51
Percent of firms for which:
|π‐hat(π)|  >  0.1   * hat(π) 93.11% 92.88% 90.77% 90.97%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  0.25 * hat(π) 82.28% 82.37% 75.56% 76.37%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  0.5   * hat(π) 63.69% 63.95% 49.63% 51.60%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  1       * hat(π) 30.42% 30.38% 14.80% 16.23%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  2       * hat(π) 11.02% 10.83% 8.35% 9.23%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  5       * hat(π) 2.04% 1.95% 2.58% 3.26%
Notes:
Model 1 is the following specification: dependent variable regressed on sales, 
net PPE, and labor costs.  Model 2 is identical to Model 1 except that number 




A firm's actual profit level or enterprise value is denoted π, whereas the 
predicted value is denoted hat(π).  30
Model 1212
Number of Firms 11,103 11,103 1,473 1,473
mean[ |π‐hat(π)|  / hat(π) ] 1.07 1.19 2.53 0.96
median[ |π‐hat(π)|  / hat(π) ] 0.66 0.73 0.53 0.55
Percent of firms for which:
|π‐hat(π)|  >  0.1   * hat(π) 93.00% 93.46% 92.12% 92.12%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  0.25 * hat(π) 82.18% 82.69% 78.82% 78.62%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  0.5   * hat(π) 64.23% 65.45% 53.16% 53.84%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  1       * hat(π) 30.50% 33.31% 13.37% 16.09%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  2       * hat(π) 10.77% 13.10% 6.86% 8.28%
|π‐hat(π)|  >  5       * hat(π) 1.86% 2.65% 1.83% 2.65%
Notes:
A firm's actual profit level or enterprise value is denoted π, whereas the





Model 1 is a constrained estimation using the following independent variables: 
sales, net PPE, and labor costs, each constrained to have identical coefficients. 
Model 2 is identical to Model 1 except that number of employees is substituted 




Profit/Loss Before Tax Sample Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation No. Obs.
Profit/Loss Before Tax 900 455 3,855 11,103
Sales 19,541 12,009 27,330 11,103
Property, Plant and Equipment 5,442 2,517 10,813 11,103
Labor Compensation 3,726 2,311 4,947 11,103
Employment 0.081 0.046 0.155 11,103
Enterprise Value Sample Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation No. Obs.
Enterprise Value 28,830 11,005 70,097 1,473
Sales 31,781 16,403 44,394 1,473
Property, Plant and Equipment 9,806 3,694 18,506 1,473
Labor Compensation 6,689 3,897 8,968 1,473
Employment 0.142 0.073 0.290 1,473
Appendix Table 1
Descriptive Statistics - Weighted
Notes: The weight is one divided by the square root of contemporaneous firm assets.
 